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Abstract
The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS)
project conducted Flight Test 6 (FT6) in 2019. The ultimate goal of this flight
test was to produce data to inform RTCA SC-228’s Phase II Minimum Operational
Performance Standards (MOPS) for Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Low Size, Weight,
and Power Sensors. This report documents the analysis of scripted encounters’ data.
Scripted encounters flown were analyzed and categorized based on the outcome of
alert, maneuver guidance, and effectiveness of pilots’ maneuver in resolving conflicts.
Results indicate that UAS pilots’ decisions as well as intruder maneuvers are leading
factors that contribute to ineffective DAA maneuvers. Results also show that adding
buffers to the DAA’s suggested minimum turn angle improves effectiveness of the
DAA maneuvers.
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Nomenclature
ADS-B = Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
ATC = Air Traffic Control
CPA = Closest Point of Approach
DAA = Detect and Avoid
DAIDALUS = Detect and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems
DWC = DAA Well Clear
FAA = Federal Aviation Administration
FT6 = Flight Test 6
GCS = Ground Control Station
HITL = Human-in-the-Loop
IP = Initial Point
JADEM = Java Architecture for DAA Extendibility and Modeling
LoDWC = Loss of DWC
LVC = Live Virtual Constructive
MOPS = Minimum Operational Performance Standards
NAS = National Airspace System
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NMAC = Near Mid-Air Collision
RGCS = Research Ground Control Station
SCO = System Checkout
SPUT = Subject Pilots Under Test
SWaP = Low Size, Weight, and Power
4tact = Actual Turn Time
θc = Target Course
θh = Target Heading
4tpred = Predicted Turn Time
UA = Unmanned Aircraft
UAP = Unmanned Aircraft Processor
UAS = Unmanned Aircraft System
Vg = Ground Speed−→
Vg = Ground Speed Vector−→
V start,M,OS = Intruder Velocity at the Start of Ownship Maneuver
4−−→Vint = Change of Intruder Speed
Vtas = True Airspeed−−→
Vtas = True Airspeed Vector−−→
V (t)int = Intruder Velocity
VSCS = Vigilant Spirit Control Station
Vw = Wind Speed−→
Vw = Wind Speed Vector
WCR = Well Clear Recovery−→wi = Initial Wind Velocity−→wf = Final Wind Velocity
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1 Introduction
Successful integration of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations into airspaces
populated with manned aircraft relies on an effective Detect and Avoid (DAA) Sys-
tem. A DAA system provides surveillance, alerts, and maneuver guidance (re-
ferred to as guidance in this report) to keep a UAS “well clear” of other air-
craft [1–4]. With research contributions from National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA), industry, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
the RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) published the Minimum Operational
Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA systems [5] and air-to-air radar [6] in
2017. The corresponding Technical Standard Orders (TSO), TSO-C211 and TSO-
C212, were published by the FAA in October 2017. A DAA system, according to
the published DAA MOPS, includes surveillance components of Automatic Depen-
dent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In, airborne active surveillance, and air-to-air
radar that can detect aircraft with or without transponders. Additional develop-
ment, named Phase 2, for extending the MOPS to additional UAS categories and
operations is underway.
One objective of the Phase 2 development seeks to define requirements for operations
of UAS equipped with low size, weight, and power (SWaP) sensors, or low SWaP
UAS. While ADS-B and active surveillance can fit in the payload of many medium-
sized UAS, the large, high-power radar required by the Phase 1 MOPS is physically
infeasible and/or economically impractical for many UAS operations. Low SWaP
sensors have favorable payloads but provide smaller surveillance volumes. For safety
and operational suitability, UAS pilots need sufficient alerting times to evaluate and
execute DAA maneuvers in order to maintain separation defined by the DAA Well
Clear (DWC). Thus, UAS equipped with Low SWaP sensors have speed restrictions
to help ensure pilots have sufficient alerting time.
The UAS Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project at NASA
established partnership with Honeywell International in 2017 to conduct a shared
resource project for further development of a prototype airborne low SWaP surveil-
lance system. Honeywell provided a prototype airborne radar called DAPA-Lite as
a candidate for validating and verifying proposed performance requirements for low
SWaP surveillance systems within a DAA system. NASA provided UAS integration
support as well as flight test planning and execution.
Flight Test 6 (FT6) was conducted at NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center
from August to November 2019. The overall objective of FT6 was to collect data to
inform the development of the Phase 2 DAA and low SWaP sensors’ requirements.
FT6 was conducted in 3 configurations, each having its own sub-objective: Radar
Characterization assessed the performance of Honeywell’s DAPA-Lite. Scripted En-
counters validated the performance of a DAA system under a limited surveillance
volume. Full Mission collected subject pilot’s performance data performing DAA
tasks in a real-world test environment to validate previous human-in-the-loop sim-
ulations. This report focuses on analysis of the scripted encounters data.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background infor-
mation on DAA, and Section 3 describes flight operations. Section 4 discusses data
analysis results, such as effectiveness of DAA maneuvers, flight card categorization,
alerting performace, and trajectory errors.
2 Detect and Avoid
The DAA system aims to keep the UAS “well clear” of other manned aircraft. The
DAA system consists of surveillance components, alerting and guidance algorithms,
ground control station for UAS operator and pilot, and command and control sys-
tems. The DAA MOPS defines quantitatively a DWC around other aircraft the
UAS should avoid. Alerts and guidance aim at assisting the UAS operator or pilot
in maintaining separation defined by the DWC. The DAA MOPS also defines dis-
play requirements for alerts and guidance [7]. The DAA MOPS assumes the UAS
is flying by instrument flight rules (IFR), and the UAS pilot or operator is expected
to coordinate with air traffic control (ATC) for a conflict avoidance maneuver.
During the scripted encounters, a cylindrical DWC definition of 450 ft vertical sep-
aration and 2200 ft horizontal separation was utilized [8]. A loss of DWC (LoDWC)
occurs when the horizontal and vertical separations are simultaneously violated [9].
The DAA alerting structure is comprised of three alert types: preventive, corrective,
and warning. A preventive alert is a caution level alert that requires a maneuver
to avoid a predicted DWC violation, but advises the pilot to maintain the UAS’s
current altitude to avoid conflicts. A corrective alert is a caution level alert that
advises the pilot to coordinate with ATC before maneuvering. A warning alert
requires immediate action from the pilot to start maneuvering to maintain DWC [7].
The scripted encounters in FT6 only trigger corrective and warning alerts. Figure 1
shows the alerting timeline and the corresponding guidance.
Figure 1: Alerting Timeline
[7]
The guidance includes ranges of heading and altitude, shown as bands on a display
system (see Section 3.6), predicted by the DAA system to have a high likelihood of
leading to a LoDWC given a look-ahead time of typically 2 to 3 minutes. There is a
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corresponding guidance type for each alert type. Aircraft performance parameters
such as turn, climb, and descent rates can be used for computing the ranges of
heading and altitude. To execute a DAA maneuver to maintain DWC, a UAS pilot
is expected to select and maneuver the UAS to a heading or altitude that is outside
the bands.
If the ownship gets too close to the intruder, a LoDWC may become inevitable even
with maneuvers. In this situation, the guidance bands fill up all ranges of heading
and altitude, but at the same time computes “regain well clear” bands to assist the
ownship in maneuvering in order to regain well clear effectively. Regain-well-clear is
also referred to as well clear recovery (WCR). For DAA systems assuming finite turn
rates and climb/descent rates for the unmanned aircraft (UA), the WCR usually
occurs earlier than a LoDWC during an encounter [7].
A DAA system’s surveillance components include ADS-B, active surveillance, and
an onboard radar. ADS-B and active surveillance detect cooperative aircraft, i.e.,
aircraft that can broadcast ADS-B out messages and/or respond to interrogations
by active surveillance. Both ADS-B and active surveillance have decent detection
ranges beyond 10 nmi that provides more than enough alerting times for DAA.
The onboard radar detects all aircraft, including the non-cooperative aircraft that
are without a functioning transponder and cannot be detected by ADS-B or ac-
tive surveillance. Previous research results show that, for low SWaP operations, a
susitable surveillance range for the onboard radar lies between 2 and 3.5 nmi [7,10],
considering both safety and operational suitability metrics such as alerting timelines.
3 Flight Test Operations
FT6 was conducted at NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center, CA in restricted
airspace R-2515. FT6 included radar characterization, scripted encounters, and full
mission. Nine flight test days were dedicated to the scripted encounters from August
2019 to December 2019. The data analysis in this report focuses on the scripted
encounters.
The following subsections are organized in this way: Section 3.1 presents the test
aircraft. Section 3.2 discusses the encounter design. Section 3.3 describes the specific
DAA algorithm for this flight test. Section 3.4 discusses the ground control station
and its display. Section 3.5 describes the pilot procedure. Section 3.6 gives details
of data collection and the post-processing steps.
3.1 Test Aircraft
The flight test elements consist of one ownship (the UA) and one intruder manned
aircraft per encounter. A detailed introduction on the ownship and intruder is
provided in this section.
The NASC TigerShark Block 3 XP (N1750X), equipped with the Honeywell DAPA-
Lite radar for non-cooperative aircraft active surveillance, served as the ownship
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during the scripted encounters. It is a medium-altitude and long-endurance single-
engine pusher aircraft. The specifications of the Tigershark are shown in Table 1 [9].
Table 1: Specifications of Tigershark
[9, 11]
The T-34C Mentor (NASA865), TG-14 Super Ximango (NASA856), and Beechcraft
B200 King Air (NASA801) served as the intruders. They were flown against the own-
ship to evaluate the performance characteristics of the Honeywell DAPA-Lite radar
and the DAA system. The T-34C Mentor, TG-14 Super Ximango, and Beechcraft
B200 King Air have a maximum speed of 214 kts, 132 kts, and 292 kts, respec-
tively [9].
The TigerShark was equipped with ADS-B and Honeywell’s DAPA Lite radar. ADS-
B detects manned aircraft that are equipped with ADS-B out. Three panels of
DAPA-Lite Radar were installed at the nose of TigerShark and were expected to
detect and track traffic within its theoretical field of regard (±15◦ elevation and
±110◦ azimuth) regardless of whether that aircraft has other electronic means of
identification [9].
The TigerShark’s Sagetech XP transponder offers ADS-B out capability, which pro-
vides position, altitude, velocity, and other information to the test team. The MXS
transponder on the TigerShark receives NMEA GPS data from the Piccolo II au-
topilot through a serial interface. These data provided situational awareness of the
Tigershark’s altitude and position to the test team during all of the FT6 flights.
The intruder aircraft were also equipped with ADS-B out [9].
DAPA-Lite turned out to be unable to provide consistent tracks. Therefore, the
test team decided to emulate a low SWaP sensor by filtering ADS-B surveillance
data with a simulated surveillance volume. The simulated surveillance has a ±15◦
elevation range and ±110◦ azimuth range [9]. Its range (inter-aircraft distance)
varies between 2.0, 2.5, and 3.5 nmi across encounters.
The UAS pilots controlled Tigershark through an auto-pilot system called Piccolo
II. Piccolo II is a self-contained flight management computer that consists of built-in
3-axis accelerometers, 3-axis gyros, GPS, command and control radio, and various
inputs/outputs to interface with external components (e.g. servos, research pay-
loads, transponders). The pilots would type in a heading value in the Piccolo, then
press “Send” to uplink the command. For FT6, Piccolo II provided NMEA GPS
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messages to the Sagetech MXS ADS-B unit through a RS-232 serial interface. A
second serial port on the autopilot was interfaced to the Unmanned Aircraft Pro-
cessor (UAP) to provide telemetry from the air data system that was not available
from the VN-210 EGI [9]. Towards the second half of the scripted encounters, pilots
switched to Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) for issuing heading commands
to be more representative of an integrated UAS where DAA information and vehicle
commands would be executed from a common display.
3.2 Encounter Scenario Design
3.2.1 Encounter Geometry
There were several types of encounter geometries: Head-on, crossing, maneuvering
intruder, ascending and descending intruder. The encounters included five different
headings of the intruder relative to the ownship, 0◦, 40◦, 50◦, 80◦, 120◦. At the
closest point of approach (CPA), a combination of vertical and/or lateral offsets
was required of each encounter for safety. The lateral offset was 0 nmi when the
vertical offset was 500 ft, and 0.3 nmi when the vertical offset was less than 500 ft.
The ascent rate and descent rate were either 500 fpm or 1000 fpm. For encounters
with a maneuver intruder, the intruder turned into the ownship at a heading of 40◦
or 80◦ relative to the ownship.
Table 2: Scripted Encounters Flight Matrix
Table 2 lists ownship and intruder flight information. The flight matrix shows
initial point (IP)’s & CPA’s locations, angle of intruder’s heading relative to the
ownship, ownship’s altitude & ground speed, intruder’s altitude & ground speed,
vertical offset, CPA lateral offset, climb or descent rate, and maneuver point’s (MP)
location for each encounter. The flight time between an IP and a CPA is 2 minutes.
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A flight card for an encounter is comprised of 2 parts: ownship and intruder. Fig-
ure 2 and Figure 3 are dedicated to those ownship and intruder components, re-
spectively. The flight card shows the top view graphics, horizontal view graphics,
IP/CPA names and coordinates, altitudes, headings, distances, ground speeds, sen-
sor selection, abort procedures, etc [9].
Figure 2: Flight card for the Ownship
[9]
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Figure 3: Flight card for the Intruder
[9]
Unmitigated encounters indicate that the ownship and intruder would maintain the
predetermined flight path trajectories from the IP to the CPA. No aircraft makes
maneuvers to avoid the imminent LoDWC. Conversely, mitigated encounters indi-
cate that the UAS pilot was required to maneuver based on the maneuver guidance
of the DAA system to avoid the imminent LoDWC. Data analysis in this report
focuses on mitigated encounters.
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3.3 Detect-and-Avoid Algorithm
The open-source Detect and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS)
is a reference DAA algorithm for the Phase 1 MOPS [7]. The DAIDALUS reference
implementation computations of alerts are based on alerters. An alerter consists of
three sets of DWC thresholds labeled “FAR,” “MID,” and “NEAR.” The FAR, MID,
and NEAR threshold values are intended to correspond respectively to the preven-
tive, corrective, and warning alerting volumes and times. DAIDALUS’s guidance
computation for this work is based on a constant turn rate, constant acceleration of
the ownship, and constant-velocity projections of traffic aircraft. These bands are
computed for the MID and NEAR threshold values provided in the alerter [6]. In
DAIDALUS, a corrective alert was configured to indicate a predicted LoDWC within
60 seconds or less. A warning alert was configured to indicate a predicted LoDWC
within 30 seconds or less. The vertical alerting threshold for both corrective and
warning alerts was increased from 450 ft, the DWC’s vertical threshold, to a large
value of 4000 ft. The purpose of expanding this threshold from 450 ft was to keep
the alerts stable and remove the effect of vertical offsets in the flight cards on the
alerts. The horizontal distance threshold was also increased from 2200 ft to 3342 ft
in most encounters to reduce the impact of sensor uncertainties on the stability of
alerts.
The maneuver guidance provided by DAIDALUS is presented in the form of conflict
bands, i.e., ranges of headings and altitudes that lead to a well-clear violation, or
recovery bands, i.e., ranges of ownship maneuvers that recover from a present or
unavoidable well-clear violation. WCR will show up when the guidance band is
saturated to maximize separation and avoid Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) [6].
During the flight test, DAIDALUS was invoked as a plug-in to the Java Architec-
ture for DAA Extendibility and Model (JADEM) tool suite. JADEM saves aircraft
states, alerts, and guidance data to files. An additional wrapper layer around JA-
DEM, called SaaProc, provides real-time message handling, and filtering aircraft
states by the intruder’s relative position to the ownship [9, 12].
3.4 Ground Control Station
The Research Ground Control Station (RGCS) consists of the VSCS with integrated
JADEM & DAIDALUS DAA functionality, an interface to the Live Virtual Con-
structive (LVC) gateway, and a Plexsys voice communications link to the pseudo-
pilot and ATC stations. DAA maneuvers were sent to Piccolo, which relayed them
to the UA. Command and Control datalinks, comprised of an uplink and a down-
link, to the UA were provided by a Piccolo-based Ground Control Station (GCS)
and a Silvus Technologies radio system [9].
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3.5 Pilot’s Background & Procedure
The recruited Subject Pilots Under Test (SPUTs) for FT6 were active military with
a fixed wing license and have had recent flying experience including flying medium
to large fixed wing remotely piloted aircraft within the last year [13].
During the scripted encounters, the UAS pilots were expected to select at their
discretion a heading outside the conflict bands, i.e., a heading that was predicted
to be conflict-free. WCR guidance was computed and displayed to pilots when the
conflict bands saturate all the headings. In this situation, pilots were expected to
select a heading within the range of the positive guidance provided by the WCR.
The mitigated test matrix instructs the UAS pilot to execute a maneuver 8 seconds
after a corrective alert is triggered or 3 seconds after a warning alert is triggered.
Some flight cards required that the UAS pilot execute maneuver upon initiation
of a warning alert or an alert that appears first. Results show that, due to various
reasons, UAS pilots did not adhere strictly to the instructions regarding timing and,
in some encounters, executed maneuvers very late.
3.6 Data Collection and Post-Processing
Data were collected during the flight test and post-processed. Figure 4 shows the
data collection processes and post-processes. The solid arrows represent data flow
in real time; the dotted arrows represent data flow in post-processing. The dashed
boxes stand for processes or devices, and the solid boxes stand for data storage.
Figure 4: Data Flow Diagram
JADEM log files and LVC messages were two types of data collected and analyzed.
They provided aircraft states, DAA alert and guidance, and pilots’ target maneuver
course and heading data.
The Sense-and-Avoid Processor (SAAP) recorded and stored the ownship’s surveil-
lance data from individual sensors. The surveillance data were sent to an onboard
fusion tracker from Honeywell that performed track coordinate transformation, fil-
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tering, association, and fusion. The LVC Gateway received flight state messages,
time-stamped them, and forwarded them to the SaaProc [14]. The SaaProc read
the flight states, computed alerts and guidance, and sent the guidance to the LVC
Gateway. The LVC Gateway not only logged the flight state messages in LVC mes-
sage files but also received guidance messages from SaaProc and forwarded them to
VSCS. VSCS also sent pilot’s maneuvers to the LVC Gateway. SaaProc recorded
the flight states, alerts, and maneuvers as JADEM log files [12].
It was necessary to post-process some flight test data to see if the alert was ac-
tive when the pilot-selected avoidance maneuver heading was captured. FT6 LVC
messages from the scripted encounters were post-processed into encounter files that
included aircraft state using an LVC translator. Afterwards, the encounter files
were utilized to re-compute alert and guidance using SaaProc configuration files
that were configured to remove the simulated radar field of view to produce a new
set of JADEM log files.
Figure 5: Vigilant Spirit Display
Figure 5 shows a corrective alert for the intruder. The color of the icon for the
intruder indicates the threat level. The horizontal as well as the vertical guidance
bands are shown on display. The white arrow points at the steering window where
the UAS pilots use the Vehicle Steering Command, such as heading, altitude, and
speed hold commands and Air Vehicle Position Waypoint command to control the
UAS [9]. Only heading maneuvers were executed during the Scripted Encounters
configuration.
4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Flight Cards Summary
System checkout (SCO) flights were flown in August of 2019 prior to the data col-
lection days for radar characterization and scripted encounters (SE). Flight data
from System Checkout flight days and scripted encounters showed good quality and
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were included for data analysis. The flight days from which data are analyzed
are SCO#5(08/13/19), SCO#6(08/22/19), SCO#7(08/28/19), SCO#8(08/29/19),
SCO#9(09/24/19), SE1(10/01/19), SE2(10/03/2019), SE3(10/08/2019), and SCO#10(10/16/19).
A total of 96 encounters were attempted. Among these 96 encounters, 72 led to a
collection of alerting and guidance data successfully. The other 24 encounter data
was not collected due to the triggering of improper alerts. The total flight hours
were 29.8.
4.2 Categorization by Maneuver Outcomes
4.2.1 Flight Card Categorization Scheme & Statistics
Figure 6: Categorization by Maneuver Outcomes (Number of Encounters in Associated
Classification)
Figure 6 depicts the overall maneuver outcome categorization. Data analysis focused
on the 90 mitigated encounters. These encounters were classified based on the out-
come of alert, guidance, and effectiveness of pilots’ maneuver in resolving conflicts.
Twenty-four encounters were excluded from additional analysis due to data issues
such as segmentation fault on the UAP computer. The remaining encounters were
66.
A maneuver was ineffective if, at the completion of the maneuver, the alert was still
active. Among the 66 encounters analyzed for maneuver effectiveness, 36 of these
had maneuvers effectively resolving conflicts. Six encounters with maneuvers based
on WCR were also excluded. The remaining encounters with ineffective maneuvers
were further analyzed for potential causes. Among those 30 encounters with inef-
fective maneuvers, fourteen were attributed to pilots’ decisions, one attributed to
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a true heading/true course mismatch, and the other 9 were attributed to trajec-
tory prediction errors. Three sources of trajectory prediction errors were analyzed:
change of intruder’s velocity, wind error, and turn rate error. An encounter could
exhibit multiple sources of trajectory error. Six of the encounters in the pilots’ de-
cision category also had contributions from change of intruders’ velocities. The lead
contributing factors were pilots’ decision and change of intruders’ velocities.
During the scripted encounters flight test phase, a true heading and true course
mismatch issue in the maneuver guidance execution was found. Pilots selected a
horizontal maneuver based on the true heading conflict bands shown on the DAA
display. However, when the maneuver was inputted to Piccolo, its heading value was
interpreted by Piccolo as a true course. This mismatch caused the actual maneuver
to deviate slightly from the intended one, the degree of which varies with the wind
condition. It is necessary to investigate whether the corresponding target heading is
in the conflict band at the maneuver. Target heading θh & target course θc difference
is given by
| θh − θc |= arccos
(
Vtas
2 + V 2g − V 2w
2VtasVg
)
(1)
Target heading θh is given by
θh = θc + arccos
(
Vtas
2 + V 2g − V 2w
2VtasVg
)
(2)
or
θh = θc − arccos
(
Vtas
2 + V 2g − V 2w
2VtasVg
)
(3)
Target heading θh can be calculated using Eq. 2 or Eq. 3 depending on the trigono-
metric relationship between the wind speed vector
−→
Vw, true airspeed vector
−−→
Vtas,
and ground speed vector
−→
Vg.
Figure 7: Target Course & Target Heading Decision Chart
Figure 7 shows whether the target heading or/and target course is/are conflict-free
at the time of maneuver. The time of a maneuver is estimated from the ownship’s
state data by observing the first time the ownship started turning. Note this time
may be a few seconds after the time the pilot submitted the heading command on
the ground due to the system’s latency. The circle represents “conflict-free,” and the
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cross represents “in conflict.” When both the target heading and the target course
are in the conflict band, it will be called “Pilots’ Decision.” If the target heading
is in conflict, but the target course is conflict-free, it will be called “True Course
& True Heading Mismatch.” The sources of error, such as change of intruder’s
velocity, wind error, and turn rate error, will be analyzed when the target heading
is conflict-free.
4.2.2 Explanations of Categories with Examples
I. Exclusion
The exclusion category indicated that alerts were not properly triggered, or there
were technical difficulties getting the data. When the timing was off, alerts were
unstable, or Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation (SUM) led to very early WCRs, the flight
cards were considered having improper alerts. The encounters were excluded if the
segmentation faults occurred on the UAP computer that managed the payload, or
data were not obtained.
II. Maneuver upon Well Clear Recovery
The pilots selected a target heading based on the WCR guidance at the maneuver.
Maneuvering upon WCR was undesirable because the UAS pilots maneuvered late.
Figure 8 shows an example of WCR. The upper left panel shows the true course
and true heading of the ownship v.s. time. The red color and green color indicate
the warning band and the WCR guidance, respectively. The upper mid panel shows
the trajectories for the ownship and the intruder. The upper right panel shows the
distance between the ownship and the intruder as the time elapses. The bottom
left panel shows the wind direction relative to the true north measured from the
ownship. The bottom middle panel shows the ground speed for the ownship and the
intruder as well as the wind speed. The bottom right panel shows ownship’s turn
rate as the time elapses.
Figure 8: Example of WCR
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III. Effective Maneuver
Effective maneuver indicated that the ownship was conflict-free at the end of the
maneuver. Namely, all the alerts disappeared when the turn was completed. There
were 34 effective maneuvers. Figure 9 presented an example of an effective maneuver.
Figure 9: Example of an Effective Maneuver
IV. Pilots’ Decision
Pilots’ decision indicated that the ineffectiveness of the maneuvers was caused by
both the target course that the pilots selected and its calculated target heading in
the conflict bands. Figure 10 presented an example of pilots’ decision.
Figure 10: Example of Pilots’ Decision
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V. True Course & True Heading Mismatch
The target course was outside the conflict band; however, its calculated target head-
ing was inside the conflict band. Figure 11 presented an example of true course &
true heading mismatch.
Figure 11: Example of True Course & True Heading Mismatch
VI. Change of Intruder’s Velocity
The criteria is given by
| 4−−→Vint |=|
−−→
V (t)int −−→V start,M,OS |≥ 10kts (4)
According to Eq. 4, the change of intruder’s velocity is calculated by the magnitude
of the vector difference between the intruder’s velocity as a function of time and
intruder’s velocity at the start of ownship maneuver. There were five encounters in
this category. Three out of the total five encounters had a maneuvering intruder.
Figure 12 shows an intruder that kept turning, which caused difficulty to the DAA
algorithm. A right turn appeared to be feasible for resolving the conflict at one
time. However, the intruder maneuver “closed the gate” afterwards. According for
intruder’s accelerations may improve predictions.
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Figure 12: Example of Change of Intruder’s Velocity
VII. Wind Error
The criteria is given by
| −→wf −−→wi |
| −→wi | ≥ 40% (5)
If the magnitude of the vector difference between the wind velocity before the ma-
neuver −→wi and wind velocity after the turn is completed −→wf is over 40% of the
magnitude of wind velocity | −→wi | before the maneuver, the encounter will be clas-
sified as wind error. There were three encounters that belonged to this category.
Figure 13 shows an encounter where both the magnitude of the wind velocity and
the wind direction change were large.
Figure 13: Example of Wind Error
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VIII. Turn Rate Error
The criteria is given by
| 4tact −4tpred |
4tpred ≥ 50% (6)
If the difference between the actual turn time 4tact and the predicted turn time
4tpred is over 50% of 4tpred, the encounter will be considered having turn rate
error. 4tpred is calculated using a standard turn rate of 7 deg/s, and 4tact is
measured from the start of the turn to the end of the turn with a cutoff turn rate of
0.75 deg/s. When the turn is small, the turn error tends to be larger because of its
lower average turn rate. There were seven encounters in turn rate error category.
Figure 14 presents an encounter where the turn rate error was 87.36 % and had an
average turn rate of 3.48 deg/s because of its small turn.
Figure 14: Example of Turn Rate Error
4.3 Breakdown by Surveillance Range
For the mitigated encounters, a simulated surveillance range was chosen to be 3.5
nmi, 2.5 nmi, and 2.0 nmi, which were potential candidates for required surveillance
ranges for low SWaP sensors. The number of encounters that were flown with 3.5
nmi, 2.5 nmi, and 2.0 nmi surveillance ranges is 35, 36, and 19, respectively. After
removing the flight cards from the exclusion and WCR category, the effectiveness and
ineffectiveness rates for each surveillance range were tabulated in Table 3. Results
suggest that encounters with 3.5 nmi had a higher probability of achieving effective
DAA maneuvers.
Table 3: Effectiveness & Ineffectiveness Breakdown by Surveillance Range
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4.4 Trajectory Error Analysis
The DAIDALUS modeled the turn using an infinite roll rate at the start of the
maneuver and at the end of the turn and a fixed turn rate during the turn. A
simulation was run to emulate the turn using the initial and target conditions from
the ownship state data collected during FT6. Initial conditions for the trajectory
error simulation were wind speed, wind direction, true course, altitude, aircraft
position, and aircraft ground speed with a standard turn rate of 7 deg/s. Target
conditions were altitude, true course, and true heading. Wind speed, wind direction,
aircraft ground speed, and altitude were held constant in the simulation.
Figure 15: Trajectory Comparison
Figure 16: Simulated Turn Rate & Actual Turn Rate
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Figure 15 shows the discrepancy between the simulated and actual trajectories dur-
ing the turn and after the turn. The simulated trajectory turned faster compared to
the actual flight test trajectory. Figure 16 shows that the turn rate for the simulated
turn was at 7 deg/s during the turn; however, the actual turn rate was increased
to 7.4 deg/s within the first few seconds, then fluctuated between 5 to 7 deg/s, and
eventually went down.
Figure 17 indicates that the majority of the maximum turn rates for mitigated
encounters was between 6 to 8 deg/s. The FT6 data showed that the range of turn
rate was reasonable.
Figure 17: Turn Rate Histogram
4.5 Buffered Heading and Encounter Effectiveness Analysis
Adding a buffer to the DAA’s suggested minimum turn angle creates a “buffered
heading.” Figure 18 depicts how the buffered heading affected the effectiveness of
the encounters. The analysis likely included the effects of the mismatch between
true course and true heading, but the effect on the overall results is expected to
be minor. The angle was calculated using the difference between the target course
& the edge of the conflict band. When the angle was negative, the target course
was in conflict. If the angle was positive, the target course was conflict-free. If the
angle was less than -75 deg, band saturation might have occurred. The majority of
the ineffective encounters had pilots’ maneuvers inside the conflict band. Whereas,
maneuvers were more effective when buffers were larger. Therefore, adding more
buffer to the target heading may increase the probability of effectiveness.
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Figure 18: Buffered Heading & Encounter Effectiveness Histogram
5 Conclusions
The analysis of FT6 data was focused on classifying mitigated encounters based on
the effectiveness of the DAA maneuver in resolving conflicts. For maneuvers exe-
cuted in a timely fashion before WCR, more than half of these maneuvers effectively
resolved conflicts. When categorized by surveillance range, a 3.5 nmi surveillance
range achieved a higher success rate (about 70%) than 2.5 and 2.0 nmi (about 50%).
Enlarging the surveillance range from 2.0 nmi and 2.5 nmi to 3.5 nmi increased the
effectiveness of the maneuver.
When the maneuver turned out to be ineffective, additional analysis was done to
determine the cause(s) of the ineffectiveness, such as pilots’ decision, the true course
and true heading mismatch, and trajectory prediction errors. Three main sources of
trajectory prediction error were analyzed: change of intruder velocity, wind error,
and turn rate error. Among all the ineffective encounters, the major contributing
causes are pilots’ decision and change of intruders’ velocities.
When analyzing the category of change of intruder’s velocity, it was observed that
maneuvering intruders presented a challenging case for the DAA algorithm. The
data show that accounting for potential accelerations in the intruder’s trajectory
should be strongly considered for future flight tests.
Trajectory error analysis successfully showed the discrepancies between the actual
and simulated turn rates. Besides, the actual and simulated trajectories were plotted
graphically to show the deviation between the two.
Buffered heading & encounter effectiveness analysis was conducted. It was ascer-
tained from the results that it may be beneficial for pilots to add more buffer to the
target heading to increase the maneuver effectiveness.
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